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Abstract
We give a formal treatment of optimal risk sharing contracts in the face of ambiguity. The ambiguity in a
contract arises from clauses that are interpreted by the parties in di⁄erent ways. The cost of ambiguity is
represented in terms of perceived dispute costs. Taking the potential for dispute into account, we ￿nd that
risk averse agents may forgo potential gains from risk sharing and choose incomplete contracts instead.
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University of Queensland1 Introduction
The idea that contractual incompleteness is related in some way to ambiguity seems appealing
(Mukerji, 1998). Appropriately enough, however, this idea is itself ambiguous. In ordinary us-
age, the term ￿ ambiguity￿refers to the semantic property of propositions or sets of propositions
admitting multiple, mutually inconsistent interpretations. The fact that the terms of contracts
may be interpreted in di⁄erent ways by di⁄erent parties is well-known and is a disincentive to the
adoption of complex contracts with exotic provisions. This fact is naturally expressed with refer-
ence to the potential ambiguity of contracts. Most discussion of the relevant issues of knowledge,
awareness and so on is undertaken in terms of the semantic interpretation of propositions, and
consistent with this, we will use the term ￿ semantic ambiguity￿to refer to ambiguity as a property
of propositions that cannot be expressed in terms of events (measurable subsets of a state space).
On the other hand, in state-contingent approaches to decision theory, the term ￿ ambiguity￿
is commonly used in relation to the fruitful body of work beginning with Ellsberg (1961), who
built on earlier contributions by Keynes and Knight. Appropriately enough, there is no generally
agreed de￿nition of ￿ ambiguity￿in this context. Broadly speaking, however, events are ambiguous
if preferences regarding acts measurable with respect to those events cannot be rationalized by a
subjective probability distribution. It seems plausible to suggest that contracting over ambiguous
events will prove di¢ cult. This suggestion has been formalized with speci￿c reference to the
incomplete contracts literature by Mukerji (1998) and with reference to ￿nancial markets by
Mukerji and Tallon (2001). We will use the term ￿ probabilistic ambiguity￿to refer to ambiguity as
a property of events for which there exists no well-de￿ned probability. Grant and Quiggin (2006)
show that semantic ambiguity implies probabilistic ambiguity, but not vice versa.
As argued by Maskin and Tirole (1999), responding to the work of Hart and Moore (1988,
1999), constraints arising from inability to describe, or even foresee possible states of nature, will
not, in general, prevent perfectly rational agents from achieving optimal contracts. This insight
seems particularly applicable to notions of semantic ambiguity, which re￿ ect the incapacity of the
natural languages used by boundedly rational human agents to achieve the unbounded expressive
power of formal languages implicit in most models of contracting.
1The purpose of this paper is to consider the role of semantic and probabilistic ambiguity in the
speci￿cation of incomplete contracts. In the process, we will show, using a model of unforeseen
contingencies incorporating bounded rationality (Grant and Quiggin 2006, Heifetz, Meier and
Schipper 2006), that the semantic and probabilistic notions of ambiguity are closely related. That
is, Ellsberg￿ s choice of terminology was indeed apposite.
Unlike most of the economics literature on incomplete contracts, we shall not consider strategic
misrepresentations or other ￿ opportunistic￿behavior of one or more parties to a contract. Rather
disputes, if they arise, will do so from ￿ honest misunderstandings￿arising from the inherent am-
biguity of natural language. Furthermore, we shall assume that each individual has complete
information relative to the representation of the world available to them in the absence of con-
tracting. Hence the only source of ambiguity in our model will be from individuals￿di⁄erent
interpretations of the world.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin with a simple example designed to motivate the
analysis. Next we describe the situation in which contracting takes place, adapting the model of
Grant and Quiggin (2006). The key idea is that the parties have access to di⁄erent state-space
representations of the world, even though they share the same natural language and use it to
describe contingencies. The di⁄erent models used by the parties may be viewed as alternative
coarsenings of the fully-speci￿ed state-space description of the world that would be available to
an unboundedly rational observer.
We then consider risk-sharing contracts which involve a rule specifying a state-contingent
transfer vector. The main interest of the paper is in the speci￿cation of the sharing rule in the
case when the state space cannot be described fully and unambiguously. The ￿ external￿perspective
of an unboundedly rational observer may be used to characterize the constrained-optimal contract
between the parties, and to derive conditions under which such a contract may be reached, even
though the parties themselves do not have access to the external description. Using this contract
as a benchmark, we consider the roles of ambiguity and risk-aversion in determining the extent of
contracting and risk-sharing.
22 Motivating example
In informal discussions of ambiguous contracts, it is common to refer to ￿ gray areas￿ . Some
contracts, or contingencies speci￿ed in contracts, are seen as having gray areas, thereby giving
rise to possibilities of disagreement and dispute, while others are seen as relatively clear-cut and
unambiguous.
We develop these ideas in an example, speci￿ed as follows.1 Suppose two individuals Row
(Rowena) and Col (Colin) are contemplating entering into a risk-sharing contract. They will draw
a card from a pack. It may be white at both ends (ranging in shades of light gray towards the
middle), black at both ends (ranging in shades of dark gray towards the middle), or white at one
end and black at the other (ranging in shades of light gray in one half to darker shades of gray in
the other half). If both ends are white (black) the card is deemed ￿ white￿(￿ black￿ ). If one end is
white and the other is black, the card ranges in shade from white-to-black or black-to-white.
Each player sees the world as black or white, and resolves shades of gray to whichever is nearer.
However, Row always observes the top half of the card, while Col always observes the bottom
half. Thus, if the card ranges from black at the top to white at the bottom, Row will observe
shades of dark gray, which she will construe as black, while Col will observe shades of light gray,
which he will construe as white. The underlying state space and the two individuals￿partitions of
the black-white spectrum are summarized in the following table:
Col￿ s observation
Card drawn is: white at bottom black at bottom
Row￿ s observation white at top white, white white,black
black at top black,white black,black
Suppose the state-contingent endowments of the two individuals are given in the following bi-
1 We are indebted to Bob Brito for this suggestion.
3matrix,
Col￿ s endowment
Card drawn is: white at bottom black at bottom










The bottom-left-hand entries of each cell of the bi-matrix are constant within a row while the
top-right-hand entries are constant within a column. That is, each individual faces a single source
of uncertainty that is measurable with respect to his own partition of the state space.
We assume that both players are risk-averse and view the two elements of their respective
partitions as ￿ exchangeable￿(Chew and Sagi, 2006). Hence both parties would prefer the risk-free
endowment yielding 1=2 in every state. So, ignoring (for the moment) any possibility of future
disagreement and dispute, both would ￿nd it attractive to sign a risk-sharing contract comprising






￿1=2 if the card drawn is ￿ white￿
1=2 if the card drawn is ￿ black￿
.
In the formal framework developed below, if such a contract were signed, the presumption is that
each party translates the contingencies on which the transfer function t depends into her or his
own formal language. For Row, this entails interpreting ￿ the card drawn is white￿as meaning ￿ top
is white￿ , while for Col, this entails interpreting ￿ the card drawn is black￿as meaning ￿ bottom is
black￿ .
The card shading from black at the top to white at the bottom creates a possibility for dis-
agreement since Row will observe dark gray shading, interpret this as ￿ black￿ , and so believe that
she is entitled to receive a payment. Col will in the same situation observe light gray shading,
interpret this as ￿ white￿ , so he will also expect a payment. Hence, a disagreement will ensue. The
card shading from white at the top to black at the bottom also is inconsistent with the explicit
4contingencies stated in the contract but since in this state both were expecting to make a transfer
to the other, we presume that this can be resolved amicably with the ￿ surplus￿shared between the
parties.
Boundedly rational players, in this setup, are unable (in the absence of some increase in e⁄ort)
to formulate a state description su¢ ciently re￿ned to encompass this possibility, allowing the
contract to specify a resolution. However, they may nonetheless be aware (in a sense made precise
by Grant and Quiggin 2006) that disputes are possible. Depending on the weight they place on this
possibility, they may choose a contract which o⁄ers only partial hedging, or even no contract at all.
This corresponds closely to the risk-uncertainty distinction of Knight (1921) whose main concern
was with uncertainties that could not be hedged through market contracts such as insurance, and
therefore reduced to manageable risk. Uncertainty of this kind was central to Knight￿ s idea of
entrepreneurship.
Some results are intuitively apparent. The parties will bene￿t less from a hedging contract the
larger (as observed from an external perspective unavailable to them) is the gray area giving rise
to dispute. They will bene￿t more from a hedging contract the more risk-averse they are, that
is, the stronger their preference for the non-stochastic endowment over the original endowment.
Thus risk and ambiguity work in opposite directions. The aim of the present paper is to develop
a formal model within which these propositions can be assessed.
3 Objective World and natural Languages
Following Grant and Quiggin (2006), we start with a formal language and an external description
of the world, in which each state of the world is a complete description of the truth or falsity of
each primitive proposition. More precisely, given a ￿nite non-empty set of primitive propositions
P = fp1;:::;pKg, a state of the world ! = (!1;:::;!K) 2 f0;1gK is a K-dimensional vector where
for all pk 2 P, !k = 0 if and only if proposition k is false. A state of the world is a complete
description of the truth and/or falsity of each primitive proposition. The set of states of the world
is denoted by ￿ = 2K. From the perspective of an unboundedly rational external observer, there
is a probability measure f on ￿.
53.1 Individual Logical Languages
Individuals in our model will not, in general, be in a position to formulate or check all the
propositions in P, and will therefore be unable by themselves to give an exhaustive speci￿cation
of the state space. We shall assume, however, that their individual logical languages, if combined
and closed under standard logical operations, would generate an exhaustive speci￿cation of ￿,
with expressive power equivalent to P.
Let I = f1;2g be the player set. Each player i 2 I can only check the truth or falsity of
some non-empty subset of primitive propositions which we denote by Pi ￿ P and for which
P1 [ P2 = P. Adopting the natural order from P for the propositions in Pi, a state of the





pk = 0 if and only if !k = 0. We adopt Si := f0;1gP
i
as the personal state space
of player i, and presume that he observes the personal state si(!) 2 Si when the state ! 2 ￿
obtains.
Restating this point from the semantic perspective, we do not presume that a player knows
the state space ￿ or the actual state of the world. Rather, each of the players i = 1;2 has access
to a state-contingent representation Si of the world, which may be viewed as a coarsening of ￿,
as in Grant and Quiggin (2006). More precisely, when ! obtains, player i observes si = si (!).
A simple distinction between our formulation and a more standard one is noted by comparing
ours to that of Osborne and Rubinstein￿ s formulation of a Bayesian Game (1994, Section 2.6).
In both formulations, the starting point is a set of states of the world and a signal function.
In our formulation, player i upon receiving si 2 Si knows only the truth and falsity of the
propositions in Pi. He may be unaware of the propositions in P ￿ Pi and of the set of states ￿.
In the formulation of a Bayesian game by Osbourne and Rubinstein, the player knows also the
set f! 2 ￿ : si(!) = sig, by which we can interpret him as knowing all the other propositions in
P ￿ Pi as well as the set ￿.
We now turn our attention to the logical language of a player. We presume that this can be
described by a set of formulas Li obtained inductively from Pi as follows:
6F1: any p 2 Pi is a formula;
F2: if A and B are formula, so are :A,:B, A ^ B, and A _ B; (where :, ^ and _, refer to the
logical operations of ￿ NOT￿ , ￿ (inclusive) OR￿and ￿ AND￿ , respectively).
F3: Every formula is obtained by a ￿nite number of applications of F1 and F2.
From a semantic point of view, the truth or falsity of each proposition A in a player i￿ s
language Li is determined for each personal state si(!) 2 Si from the truth or falsity of A at the
corresponding ! 2 ￿. The truth assignment of player i is the function ki : Si ￿ Pi ￿! f0;1g
de￿ned by ki(si;p) = si
p for each p 2 Pi:We then extend the function ki to the remaining formula
Li inductively as follows. For any A;B 2 Li:
T1: ki(si;:A) = 1 i⁄ ki(si;A) = 0;
T2: ki(si;A ^ B) = 1 i⁄ ki(si;A) = 1 and ki(si;B) = 1;
T3: ki(si;A _ B) = 1 i⁄ ki(si;A) = 1 or ki(si;B) = 1.
In summary, a state of the world ! determines a signal si(!) that player i receives. The truth
or falsity of a formula A 2 Li at state si(!) is then determined by ki and T1, T2, T3.
For example, suppose that P = fp1;p2;p3g, and Pi = fp1;p3g. Then,
￿ = f(0;0;0);(0;0;1);(0;1;0);(0;1;1);(1;0;0);(1;0;1);(1;1;0);(1;1;1)g, and by our convention,
Si = f(0;0);(0;1);(1;0);(1;1)g. If the state of the world ! = (!1;!2;!3) occurs, then player
i receives the signal si(!) = (!1;!3). For example, if ! = (0;1;0), then player i observes
si(!) = (0;0). In this case, only proposition p2 is true, but player i only sees that p1 and p3
are false. He might not even conceive of p2 since it is not in his language. He can, however, check
the truth or falsity of any formula in Li using his signal and T1 to T3.
Interactions between players with limited awareness gives rise to a lattice structure similar to
that described by Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006).2 In this lattice structure, languages may
be ordered by the subset relationship on the set of primitive propositions from which they are
generated, or equivalent by the re￿nement of the partition of ￿ they generate. The meet and
join relationships ^ are de￿ned in the natural way. For the purposes of the present paper we can
2 For a similar development in a dynamic context of individual unawareness, see Grant and Quiggin (2006).
7focus on the minimal non-trivial lattice consisting of L1;L2;L1 _L2;L1 ^L2: So we do not model
contingencies unforeseen by either party, which would require a language richer than L1 _ L2.
Conversely, all contingencies expressible in L1 ^ L2 are mutually expressible (this term will be
made precise below) so there is no need to consider any less re￿ned language than L1 ^ L2.
3.2 Probabilities, beliefs and awareness
We presume that player i￿ s prior belief gi over Si is consistent with the probability measure f
that describes the beliefs of an external observer in the following sense. For each si 2 Si, if we let

















In the terminology of Grant and Quiggin (2006), the individual￿ s beliefs, in the pre-contract
situation, represent Bayesianism in a restricted domain. That is, neither party￿ s beliefs about the
propositions accessible to them in the natural language are conditioned on implicit beliefs about
propositions in P ￿ Pi, so their beliefs may be represented simply as the marginal distribution
derived from f. Thus, the model presented here represents a minimal departure from the standard
assumption of unbounded rationality.
Although players in this model have probabilistic beliefs, they are not in a position to act
as consistent Bayesians. They may encounter evidence (such as a contract dispute) that reveals
that their representation of the world is incomplete. Normally parties to a contract will have
past experience of contracts some of which have ended in dispute. Thus they will be aware (in a
sense made precise by Grant and Quiggin, 2006) of the possibility of disputes, even though this
possibility is not explicitly represented in their state-contingent model of the world.
84 Contracts
We consider choice settings in which players can write contracts to share risk via transfers. In the
absence of contracts we presume that each player i faces risk described by a personal-state con-
tingent income vector Zi 2 RS
i
. When the state si 2 Si obtains, player i receives the endowment
Zi(si). He is presumed to be an expected utility maximizer with utility function ui : R ! R .
The expected utility of his personal-state contingent income vector is his reservation utility which







In addition to the propositions in P which can be used to describe the world, we assume
that the players speak in a shared informal ￿ natural￿language. This is described by a ￿nite set
of contingencies Q = fq1;:::;qMg. Contracts will be written in terms of these contingencies. A
vector x = (xq)q2Q 2 f0;1gQ is interpreted as meaning all the contingencies q 2 Q with xq = 1
are true and all those with xq = 0 are false. We will allow players to write transfers on the vectors
in f0;1gQ.
A contract is a function t : f0;1gQ ! R.
The function t is a transfer function specifying the amount of transfer from player 2 to player
1 as a function of the contingencies that are true.
Each player interprets the contract using his formal language. For this purpose we assume
that each player i has a translation function which is an injection Ti : Q ! Li. He uses his
translation function to determine the truth or falsity of each contingency. Formally, each player
i 2 I checks the vector ^ xi ￿
si￿
2 f0;1gQ, where ^ xi
q(si) = 1 if and only if ki(si;Ti(q)) = 1. For
notational convenience we de￿ne xi (!) ￿ ^ xi ￿ si (!). When a contract t is in place and state !
obtains, player i expects the transfer from player 2 to player 1 to be t(xi(!)). Since the players
have di⁄erent languages and translation functions, there is no guarantee that t(x1(!)) = t(x2(!))
for each ! 2 ￿. We do impose, however, one condition on the translation functions. We presume
that the translation functions T1 and T2 are consistent on mutually expressible parts in the sense
that for each q 2 Q and for all i;j,
Ti(q) 2 Lj implies that Ti(q) = Tj(q).
9If the translation functions are consistent on mutually expressible parts and P1 = P2 (= P),
then T1 = T2 everywhere, since in this case L1 = L2. In such a case, there would be no chance
for disputes in our setup. The possibility of a dispute might occur only when T1(q) 6= T2(q).
Restricting analysis to translation functions that are consistent on mutually expressible parts
means that a dispute might only occur when one player￿ s translation of some contingency q is
not expressible in the other player￿ s language. More generally, we shall refer to a contingency
q 2 Q as an unambiguous contingency if it is semantically equivalent for the two parties, that is,
x1
q(!) = x2
q(!) for each ! 2 ￿. Let ￿ Q ￿ Q, denote the set of unambiguous contingencies.
The support of a contract t is the set Qt ￿ Q of contingencies that make a di⁄erence to the
transfer function t: We write Qt to emphasize that this set depends on the transfer function t.
More precisely, q 2 Qt i⁄ for some x 2 f0;1g
Q ; t(x) 6= t((1 ￿ xq)q;x￿q) where x￿q is the vector
obtained by deleting the q-th element of x [￿ (xq;x￿q)], and thus t
￿
(1 ￿ xq)q ;x￿q
￿
is the transfer
made in the event that the truth value of q is reversed relative to x. Hence a contract t is an
unambiguous contract if Qt ￿ ￿ Q. Players will never have any problem writing contracts on this
set of contingencies.
4.1 Misunderstandings and Dispute Costs
Although various reasons why contracts might be incomplete have been suggested (such as that
checking the truth value of contingencies is costly to the parties), we focus in this paper on the
potential cost of disputes arising from di⁄erent interpretations of a contract. When a contract
involves contingencies that are translated in di⁄erent ways by the two parties, there is a potential
for disputes to arise over which contingencies have actually been met even after the checking has
been done by each party. These disputes will in general be costly, so forward-looking parties might
choose incomplete contracts in an attempt to avoid them.








< 0, we assume that although there is a









> 0, that is, one or both parties think they should receive a payment
greater than the other party thinks it should make, then a dispute occurs. Dispute costs in any
10state ! are assumed to depend on the extent of disagreement. More precisely, the size of a dispute










and we suppose that the costs of a dispute are increasing in the size of the dispute d(!;t), that
is, we suppose there are (convex and increasing) functions ￿
1 : R ! R, ￿
2 : R ! R. We
assume ￿
i (0) = 0;i = 1;2; that is, if the players agree, there is no dispute. The surplus-splitting
assumption for d < 0 is embodied in a requirement that ￿
1 (d) + ￿
2 (d) = d, d < 0. Since
￿













(d), respectively. Our conditions imply that ￿
1 (d) and ￿
1 (d)
are linear for d ￿ 0. We might expect a kink at d = 0 but do not preclude kinks at d > 0.






















Now consider the preferences of individual i, who does not have access to a description su¢ -
ciently re￿ned to express the terms on the RHS of (1). We assume that the these preferences over
contracts may be represented by a real-valued function Ui : f0;1gQ ! R. We assume that, for





















That is, in the absence of ambiguity, each individual￿ s preferences coincide with those derived
from the external perspective. This is natural, since, for unambiguous contracts, both individuals
have access to a common language expressive enough to compute CEUi(t;si), given the available
information.

























11If this condition is satis￿ed, the individual￿ s preferences coincide with those given by CEUi(t;si),
even in ambiguous situations. Note that this equality does not imply that the individual has ac-
cess to the values f (!) and ￿
i (d(!;t) required for the computation of CEUi(t;si). It simply
states that an ambiguity-neutral individual￿ s ranking of possible contracts coincides with that
which would be computed by the external observer, given knowledge of the utility index ui. This
point is of crucial relevance in relation to the analysis of Maskin and Tirole (1999). Even if in-
dividual preferences are ambiguity-neutral, individuals cannot make calculations with respect to
a probability distribution over outcomes and therefore cannot write and implement the outcome-
contingent contracts required to achieve the ￿rst-best. In particular, although individuals are
assumed to be aware (in the sense of Grant and Quiggin 2006) of the possibility of dispute, they
do not have access either to a state-contingent description of the world ￿ne enough to include the
dispute states (since these states arise precisely from coarseness in individual￿ s partitions of the
state space) or to a probability distribution including the probability of dispute.
More generally, we may de￿ne ambiguity aversion in a fashion consistent with the character-
ization of risk-aversion, proposed by Yaari (1969), as being more averse to moves from certainty
to risk than a risk-neutral individual. Supposing that the individual never prefers an ambiguous
contract when the external planner would prefer an unambiguous one, they may be characterized
as ambiguity-averse. More formally.















) Ui (t) ￿ Ui (t0)
That is, an individual is regarded as being ambiguity-averse if he ranks an unambiguous con-
tract over an ambiguous one whenever an external observer would rank the unambiguous contract
more highly. Note that, as would be expected, ambiguity-neutrality is a polar case of ambiguity
aversion where the converse implication holds. To de￿ne the opposite polar case, we will say that
a player is maximally ambiguity-averse if Ui (t) ￿ Ui (t0) for any t, t0 such that t is unambiguous
and t0 is ambiguous.
12If the individual is risk-neutral as well as being ambiguity-neutral (that is, ui (￿) is a¢ ne) then














is the unconditional expected dispute cost. That is, the utility of the contract is simply the
expected value of the contract were it unambiguous, less the expected dispute cost.
4.2 The Nash bargaining contract
As is standard in economics, we shall assume the parties select the contract that corresponds to
the Nash bargaining solution. Here, individual rationality of each player i is evaluated relative to
his state-contigent expected utility ￿ ui which he would obtain in the absence of a contract.








Ui (t) ￿ ￿ ui￿
:
4.3 Optimal Contracts
In order to provide a benchmark for assessing the welfare characteristics of contracts potentially
available to the players, we now consider the problem faced by an external planner seeking to
maximize welfare under a range of constraints on the set of feasible contracts. The lattice structure
gives rise to a range of such solution concepts.
4.3.1 Constrained optimal contract
First let us consider the constrained-optimal contract, evaluated from the external perspective.
The cost of a dispute at ! 2 ￿ can be abbreviated by
￿






















13The planner chooses a transfer function t : f0;1g






















f (!) ￿ ￿ ui.













; and for each
x 2 f0;1g
Q, set ￿i (x) :=
￿
! : xi (!) = x
￿
.
Since our structural assumptions have ensured the planner￿ s problem is a concave program,
the ￿rst order conditions are both necessary and su¢ cient.

















































































5 ￿ 0, (5)
The ￿rst condition (4) comes from the consideration of raising the transfer t at x. The second
condition (5) comes from the consideration of lowering the transfer t at x. The ￿rst term in the
brackets of both conditions corresponds to the situation where the player i sees x. The second
term corresponds to the dispute event when player 1 sees x and player 2 sees something else. The
third term corresponds to the dispute event when player 2 sees x and player 1 sees something else.
Notice that if a particular truth assignment of the contingencies x does not lead to any disputes,




















￿ui = 0 (6)
Notice that the constrained-optimal contract is the one that would be chosen by an external
planner, seeking to maximize the product of gains in expected utility in the knowledge that the
players would have to implement the contract and deal with any resulting disputes. This contract
is available to the players as a solution to their bargaining problem. However, the constrained-
optimal might not be chosen by the players bargaining in the absence of a planner. Recall that the






used by the planner.
We can specify a su¢ cient condition for the two contracts to coincide. When both players are
ambiguity neutral, (3) implies:
Lemma 1 For ambiguity-neutral players, the planner￿ s constrained-optimal contract coincides
with the Nash bargaining solution for the players.
4.3.2 Unconstrained Optimal Contract
The unconstrained optimal contract can be viewed as the contract that would be written by an
external planner with access to the maximally expressive formal language L1 _ L2 to maximize






in place of Ui(t). Equivalently, this is
the optimal contract conditional on ￿:
Unless the players have access to L1 _ L2, the unconstrained optimal contract will not be a
feasible solution to the contracting problem facing them. In the special case where P1 = P2 =
P = fT1(q) : q 2 Qg, so that x1(!) = x2(!) = ! for all ! 2 ￿, the parties can implement the
unconstrained optimal contract without any possibility of dispute. Hence, the optimal constrained
and optimal unconstrained contracts coincide.

















Zi (si (!)) + (￿1)
(i￿1) t(!)
￿
f (!) ￿ ￿ ui
! = 0.
4.3.3 Optimal unambiguous contract
Finally, consider the optimal unambiguous contract. We restrict contracts to those whose support




q = xq 8q 2 ￿ Q
￿
For a contract t to be unambiguous, we require t(x0) = t(x), for all x0 in [x].
In this solution, the planner chooses transfer function t : f0;1g
















































[x] is the set of signal realizations for player i that map into [x].
Unlike the unconstrained optimal contract, the optimal unambiguous contract can be imple-
mented by the parties. In the situation where dispute costs ￿ are large enough to rule out any
ambiguous contract, the set of feasible contracts consists solely of unambiguous contracts. In this
case, it is easy to see that the optimal unambiguous solution is the same as the Nash bargaining
solution. We record this fact as a lemma.
Lemma 2 The optimal unambiguous contract is the Nash bargaining solution for players re-
stricted to the set of unambiguous contracts.
In the special case where P1 = P2 = P = fT1(q) : q 2 Qg, consistency on mutually ex-
pressible parts ensures that the optimal unambiguous contract coincides with the constrained and
unconstrained optimal contracts.
164.4 Welfare
We now consider a welfare ranking of the solutions discussed above. We focus on the case where
the problem is symmetric.
De￿nition 3 A contracting problem is symmetric if for any t, there exists t0 such that Ui (t) =














i t ￿ ￿
3￿i
￿i
, i = 1;2.
The ￿rst part of the de￿nition requires that for each available contract there exists a counterpart
in which the utility outcomes are reversed. The second part requires that if a contract yields the
same (ex ante) utility for both players then it also yields the same expected utility for the two
players calculated from the perspective of the external observer.
Notice that in a symmetric problem, the external planner￿ s constrained-optimal solution, the
players￿Nash bargaining solution and the optimal unambiguous contract are all ones for which
U1 (t) = U2 (t) and thus they also result in the same expected utility for both players calculated
from the perspective of the external observer. Our main result is
Proposition 3 In a symmetric problem, with ambiguity-averse players the solutions may be
Pareto-ranked by the external observer (in decreasing order) as follows:
(i) Constrained-optimal solution
(ii) Nash bargaining solution
(iii) Optimal unambiguous contract
In terms of the players￿own preferences (i.e.
￿
U1;U2￿
) (ii) is Pareto-dominant and the ranking
between (i) and (iii) depends on ambiguity aversion: (ii)=(i) for ambiguity-neutral players and
(ii)=(iii) for maximally ambiguity-averse players.
Proof. First in terms of the external observer we have: (a) since the Nash bargaining solution
is available to the external observer, it can be no better than the solution to the constrained
problem hence (i) ￿ (ii), and (b) if (iii) > (ii) then ambiguity averse players must also rank (iii)
17above (ii) but this cannot hold since the optimal unambiguous contract is available to the players
in their Nash bargaining problem, hence it follows (ii) ￿ (iii), as required. Second, in terms of
the players themselves: we have by construction (ii) as Pareto-dominant in the set of equal utility
contracts, so (ii) ￿ (i) and (ii) ￿ (iii). Lemma 1 implies (ii) = (i) for ambiguity-neutral players
and lemma 2 implies (ii) = (iii) for maximally ambiguity-averse players. ￿
4.5 Ex ante re￿nement
The solutions available to the players through contracting are Pareto-dominated by the uncon-
strained optimal solution that would be selected and implemented by an external planner. Al-
though this fact cannot be expressed in the language available to the players, they will in general
be aware that the contracts available to them are incomplete and subject to the possibility of
dispute. Expressing awareness of such possibilities requires an extension of the language available
to the players, such as that de￿ned by Grant and Quiggin (2006). As Grant and Quiggin show,
beliefs about such possibilities will not, in general be expressible in probabilistic terms, and in
particular will not admit of contingent contracting.
Suppose that the players are aware of the possibility of dispute and are also aware that by
expending e⁄ort to improve their mutual understanding before contracting, they can reduce or
eliminate the ambiguity in the contracts available to them in their common language. We will
refer to the result of such e⁄ort as ex ante re￿nement of the state space. The cost of e⁄ort may
be assumed known, but the bene￿ts available from re￿nement of the state space will not be.
Nevertheless, the players may choose to incur the cost in the hope that it will be less than the
resulting bene￿ts.
From the external perspective, it is possible to compute the expected bene￿ts and therefore
determine whether they exceed the costs. Some instances are illustrated in the examples below.
In the ex ante position, the players will not be able to make such calculations on a probabilistic
basis. In making their decisions, they may rely on past experience, as is modelled, for example, in
the case-based decision theory of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995). Alternatively, they may rely on
the advice of external advisers whose understanding is closer to that of the ideal external planner
18invoked here as an analytical device.
4.6 Example ￿Incomplete Contracting & Incomplete Risk-sharing
We now develop the example presented informally in Section 2. We assume the players are
ambiguity-neutral so the constrained-optimal and Nash bargaining solutions coincide.
The set of propositions that determine the states of the world are P = fp1;p2g, where the
propositions are interpreted as p1 = ￿ The card is white at the top￿and p2 = ￿ The card is white
at the bottom￿ . The set P generates the underlying state space ￿ = f(1;1);(1;0);(0;1);(0;0)g,
where, e.g., (1;0) corresponds to the proposition p1 ^ :p2 and the state in which the card ranges
in shades of gray from white at the top to black at the bottom. The probability over the state
space is given by: f (1;1) = f (0;0) = (1￿")=2 and f (0;1) = f (1;0) = "=2, " 2 (0;1=2). Observe
that the number " represents the probability of obtaining a ￿ gray￿card.
Row has access to the proposition p1, that is PRow = fp1g and Col has access to the set
PCol = fp2g. The state spaces for Row and Col are given by SRow = f(1)Row;(0)Rowg and
SCol = f(1)Col;(0)
Colg. Hence gi ￿
si￿
= 1=2, for si = 1;0, and for i = Row, Col.





= 1￿sCol. That is, a card perceived to be ￿ white￿by Row is good for her, and a card
perceived to be ￿ black￿by Col is good for him.
To describe a contract in our framework, we need the set of contingencies in the natural
language. We start with Q = fwg where w corresponds to the natural language contingency ￿ the
card drawn is white￿ . Formally, we have the translation functions for Row and Col de￿ned by:
TRow(w) = p1 and TCol(w) = p2.
Parties are risk-averse and preferences over lotteries conform to expected utility with a concave
and strictly increasing utility preference scaling function, u(￿). Let the cost of dispute for both
players be given by the twice-continuously-di⁄erentiable-everywhere-except-at-zero function ￿ :
R ! R, with ￿(d) = d=2, for d ￿ 0, ￿
0
+ (0) > 1=2 and ￿
00 (d) > 0, for d > 0. The rationale for us
to require ￿
0 (d) > 1=2 for d > 0, is so that if the size of dispute increases by 1 the additional cost
summed across both parties is more than 1.
19Note that this is a symmetric problem, and the Nash bargaining solution will also be symmetric.
The class of symmetric contracts involving partial hedging with transfers based on (w) consists
of contracts t, where t(x) = ￿ (1=2 ￿ x), ￿ 2 [0;1], recalling that x = 1 corresponds to w is true.
Notice ￿ = 0 corresponds to no contract, leaving both parties fully exposed to the risk associated
with the color of the card drawn. By contrast, ￿ = 1 corresponds to a ￿ full￿risk-sharing contract.
The constrained-optimal value of ￿ depends on the parameters of the model: u, ￿ and ". To


































































































We observe that ￿
￿ = 1 is optimal i⁄ " = 0, since as ￿ ! 1, the LHS of (8) goes to zero, while
the RHS is strictly positive unless " = 0.
For ￿
￿ = 0 to be an optimum (i.e., for the contract to leave the two parties completely exposed
to the risk associated with the color of the card drawn) we require
(1 ￿ ")
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That is, if inequality (9) holds then the constrained-optimal contract is incomplete in the sense
that it leaves both individuals fully exposed to the risk associated with the color of the card.
The inequality (9) may be interpreted as saying the marginal bene￿t of reducing the unhedged
risk is less than the marginal cost of dispute incurred by conditioning on a proposition open to
ambiguous interpretation. Intuitively, this condition is more likely to hold (i) the more likely a
20dispute will arise (i.e., the greater is "), (ii) the larger is the marginal cost of disagreement (i.e.
￿
0
+ (0)); and (iii) the less risk averse the individual is.
To see (iii), ￿rst notice that inequality (9) always holds for a risk neutral person since the
left-hand side is zero and the right-hand is positive (unless " = 0). More generally, suppose v is
less risk averse than u, that is, there exists a strictly increasing and convex function  , such that
v =   ￿ u. Then we have,















u0 (0) ￿ u0 (1)
u0 (0)
.
The inequality follows from the fact that the convexity of   implies  
0 (u(1)) ￿  
0 (u(0)).
4.6.1 ￿ Re￿ning￿the State Space Ex Ante
Suppose now instead, if both parties each incur a cost today of k they can ￿ learn￿about shades of
gray and hence have access to the full state space ￿ .
The Nash bargaining contract is now the unconstrained optimal contract. This contract sets

















So Row and Col would bene￿t from incurring the cost k of learning, if
































































￿ u(0 ￿ k)
￿￿
< 0 (10)
Row and Col cannot calculate this value ex ante, but it can be derived from the external
perspective which is available to them after re￿nement.




Since, unhedged risk is costly for a risk averse person and the marginal utility of incurring the ex
ante re￿nement cost is also lower for higher incomes than for the lower incomes, it follows that
inequality (11) is a su¢ cient condition for Row and Col to bene￿t from re￿nement.
5 Concluding comments
In this paper, we have shown how semantic ambiguity in contracting creates obstacles to the
achievement of complete risk-sharing and optimal coordination of production. Semantic ambiguity
may give rise to disputes even when both parties to a contract act honestly, with no attempt to
conceal or misrepresent private information. Nevertheless, given the limits of precision in language,
economic agents may prefer ambiguous contracts to the alternative contracts available given the
constraints imposed by a requirement for unambiguous speci￿cation.
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